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ARTICLE

Immaculate Deception: The Evolving
Right of Paternal Renunciation
Diane S. Kaplan*

"[I]n the field of contested paternity...
the truth is so often obscured because
social pressures create a conspiracy of
silence or, worse, induce deliberatefalsity.
-The

Honorable William J. Brennan, Jr.2

I. INTRODUCTION
The power of DNA to reveal that legal
truths are scientifically false is somewhat akin
to the discovery of gravity: once its validity is
acknowledged, it is no longer possible to cleave
to the notion that the earth is the center of the
universe. In the realm of paternity determinations, DNA technology now makes it possible
to determine who is and is not the biological father of a child.3 "Paternal renunciation" is a
newly evolving right of men who have been
misled into believing that they fathered children
who are not, in fact, their biological offspring. 4
The question of whether these men may be relieved of their paternal obligations is currently
*Diane S. Kaplan is an Associate Professor at The John
Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. Professor Kaplan
wishes to dedicate this article to her beloved friend and late
research assistant, Patricia A. Gerdes.
1. Cortese v. Cortese, 76 A.2d 717, 719 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1950).
2. In 1956, Judge Brennan of the Superior Court of New
Jersey Appellate Division became a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
about/about.html (follow "Members of the Supreme Court:
1789 to Present" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
3. Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth Is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 72 n.10 (2000) (cit-

treated with great inconsistency by the American legal system as, in increasing numbers, they
try to renounce financial and familial responsibilities for children they have parented but did
not conceive.
Paternal renunciation pits man against woman, man against child, man against state. This
paper presents the paternal renunciation dilemma from the viewpoint of each of these conflicting interests and examines the choices facing the American legal system as it attempts to
distribute the burdens and benefits among the
innocent and responsible parties.
II. LEGAL FATHERHOOD
Historically, the legal designation of "father" and consequential child support obligations were imposed on men without the benefit
of genetic proof of paternity. As the law of paternity developed from the middle ages to the
present, the ascription of fatherhood became
vested in numerous legal constructs that substituted fiction for fact because there was no beting E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L. HEALTH 1, 29
nn.159-60 (1992-93); Heather Faust, Challenging the Paternity
of Children Born During Wedlock: An Analysis of Pennsylvania Law Regarding the Effects of the Doctrines of Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity by Estoppel on the Admissibility of Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 100 DICK. L.
REV. 963, 967 (1996)).
4. See Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part L Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-Marital Children, 37 FAM.
L.Q. 35 (2003). "Paternal Renunciation" is also referred to as
"disestablishment of paternity." Id.
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ter way to establish paternity. Consequently,
men became legal fathers of children with
whom they had no biological relationship. For
example, under the marital presumption of paternity, a married man was legally presumed to
be the father of any child born of the marriage.'
Upon divorce, the presumed father was adjudicated the legal father and that judicial determination was conclusive,
final, and not subject to
6
re-examination.
More currently, married men may become
legal fathers of biologically unrelated children
through adoption, assisted reproduction, and
estoppel. Estoppel is a legal construct that infers promises arising from conduct. It "estops"
a party who took a position intending another
to rely on it from changing that position if doing
so would injure the relying party.7 Courts are
especially inclined to invoke paternity by estoppel when a man represents to a child that he is
the child's father8 or prevents the child from developing a relationship with the true biological
father.9 Paternity by estoppel is not intended to
punish, but rather to hold a man to his promise.' ° Consequently, under the estoppel doc-

trine, a husband who voluntarily assumes
parenting responsibilities for his spouse's child,
upon divorce, may be estopped to deny his paternal obligations to the child. 1
An unmarried man can become a legal father either voluntarily, by acknowledging the
paternity of a child, or involuntarily by adjudication in a paternity action. a2 As a consequence
of these varying routes to fatherhood, a man
may become a father by presumption, estoppel,
adjudication or biology: a man may be a biolog-3
ical father, a legal father, neither, or both.'
Similarly, a child may have a biological father, a
presumed father, an adjudicated father, all, or
none. As in the case of divorce, once these adjudications of paternity are final, they are binding and not subject to re-examination. 4
Before DNA paternity testing became
available, these legal constructs substituted for
biological facts because those facts were unknowable. However, in the mid-1990s DNA
testing became available to the public.15 Between 1995 and 2002, 25% to 30% of those tests
showed no genetic link between the man and
the child. a6 Although the number of men, wo-

5. The marital presumption of legitimacy stands for the
proposition, "Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant" [the nuptials speak for themselves]. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES, *446-54. The presumption dates back to the 18th
century holding by Lord Mansfield in Goodrightv. Moss that
declarations of spouses were inadmissible to bastardize a
child born of the marriage. (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B.).
Historically, the marital presumption of legitimacy could be
rebutted only with proof of the husband's impotence, sterility, or non-access to the wife. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTERINE BASTARDY 1, 9-10 (1836)).
6. Cynthia R. Mabry, Who is the Baby's Daddy (and Why
is it Importantfor the Child to Know?), 34 U. BALT. L. REV.
211, 219-20 (2004) (citing Doe v. Doe, 52 P.3d 255, 259-60
(Haw. 2002)).
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 383 (6th ed. 1991).
8. Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529, 532-33 (Pa.
1995) ("Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal determination that because of a person's conduct ... that person, regardless of his true biological status, will not be permitted to deny parentage ..
"); see also Mancinelli v.
Mancinelli, 610 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(holding husband estopped from denying paternity of marital
child because he developed a relationship with the child notwithstanding his suspicion that he may not have been the biological father); Chrzanowski v. Chrzanowski, 472 A.2d 1128,
1129-30, 1131-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding a husband estopped from denying paternity of marital child notwithstanding stipulation of lack of sexual relations with the wife, the
wife's admission that the husband was not the child's biological father, and blood tests establishing that the husband had
no genetic link to the child, because the husband parented
and financially supported the child for three years).

9. K.B. v. D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725, 730 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
(reasoning that application of estoppel may be based on a
finding that the child's opportunity to pursue a relationship
with the biological father has been foreclosed) (citing A.R. v.
C.R., 583 N.E.2d. 840, 844 (Mass. 1992)).
10. Paternity by estoppel may be applied to women as
well. In L.S.K. v. H.A.N., estoppel invoked where the noncustodial parent in a lesbian relationship sought to renounce
her obligations to the former couple's child. 813 A.2d 872,
878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
11. See cases cited supra note 8.
12. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 664 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
13. Jeffrey A. Parness, FederalizingBirth CertificateProcedures, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 105, 109-10 (2003); see also Draper
v. Truitt, 621 N.E.2d 202, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); E.B.M. v.
V.W., 586 So.2d 230, 231 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).
14. See, e.g., Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389, 423 (Md.
2000) (Wilner, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "declaration of
paternity embodied in an order entered by a circuit court in a
paternity case was final ... once 30 days elapsed without the
noting of an appeal or the filing of a motion [for relief from
judgment] ... the declaration of paternity became truly final
and unreviewable"); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 51038(a)(1) (2004) (mandating that "a declaration of paternity
in an order is final").
15. Ruth Padawer, Paternity Testing Can Leave More
Questions Than Answers, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb.
22, 2004, at 14F.
16. Id. (citing statistics of the American Association of
Blood Banks).
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men, and children who will be affected by the
power of DNA to disprove biological paternity
presently is unknown, 7 it is reasonable to assume that once known the numbers will be sufficiently significant to disrupt traditional legal
constructs of fatherhood. The resulting
firestorm of litigation borne of sex, money, betrayal, and abandonment might befit a French
bedroom farce but for the tragic choice it compels: should wrongfully adjudicated "fathers"
be permitted to use DNA test results to renounce legal adjudications of paternity when
doing so will subject children to trauma, illegitimacy, and abandonment? Consider the following cases:
A. The Dupe
In Miscovich v. Miscovich, Gerald and
Elizabeth married and had a son."8 When they
divorced, Gerald did not contest either his paternity or his child support obligation and, consequently, the court adjudicated Gerald to be
the boy's legal father.' 9 Eventually, however,
Gerald came to doubt his paternity once he realized that, although he and Elizabeth had blue
eyes, the child's eyes were brown."0 Shortly after DNA tests established that he and the child
were not genetically related, Gerald renounced
his familial and financial obligations to the boy
and discontinued all contact with him.2 Eventually, Elizabeth sued Gerald for child support." When Gerald tried to introduce the
DNA test results to disprove his paternity, the
court excluded the test as irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. 3 The court said, "there is
17. For example, the tiny state of Maryland has estimated
that the recognition of a right of paternal renunciation could
reopen between a quarter of a million and half a million
judgments in that state alone. See Langston, 754 A.2d at 425
(Wilner, J., dissenting).
18. 688 A.2d 726, 727 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 727 n.1.
21. Id. at 727-28.
22. Id. at 727.
23. Id. at 733.
24. Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 732 (emphasis added) (quoting
Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351,
355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962).
25. Lord Mansfield's exclusionary rule of 1777 held that
under the law of England, "the declarations of a father or
mother [could not] be admitted to bastardize the issue born
after marriage," Goodright,98 Eng. Rep. at 1257; Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 124 (citing H. Nicholas, ADULTERINE BASTARDY
1, 9-10 (1836)).

something disgusting about a husband who,
moved by bitterness toward his wife, suddenly
questions the legitimacy of her child whom he
has been accepting and recognizing as his
own. ,,24

Gerald's dilemma was paradoxical. First
he was betrayed by an adulterous wife who
duped him into assuming the parenting obligations of another man. Then he was ordered to
financially support the child born of the adulterous affair because a court refused to admit conclusive biological evidence of non-paternity to
rebut the conclusive marital presumption of paternity.
The marital presumption of paternity dates
back to the eighteenth century 25 when its purposes were to protect children from illegitimacy, the husband's reputation from insinuations of cuckoldry, and his property from the
fraudulent claims of third party usurpers to his
estate. 6 In Gerald's case, however, the marital
presumption of paternity served only to treat
the child like a marital debt, which, upon divorce, was distributed equitably between the
spouses, regardless of which spouse incurred
the obligation. 7
B. The Absentee
While on active duty in the First Gulf War,
Taron James was "named, 28 as "the father" on
the birth certificate of a child he never knew existed. 29 A default judgment of paternity and
support was entered against him under California law.3 ° By the time James learned of the default judgment, the six-month appeal period
26. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-25 (citations omitted); see
also Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TuL. L. REV.
585, 588-89 (1991); JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN
EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 54 (Cornell University Press
1982); Ettore I. v. Angela D., 513 N.Y.S.2d 733, 738-40 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987); Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 179 (Pa.
1997).
27. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 75-76 n.2.
28. Historically, mothers have been permitted to "name"
the biological father in court when seeking financial support.
The practice of "naming" was an exception to the formerly
accepted rule of evidence that parties to lawsuits could not
testify in their own behalf. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1981) (citing Booth v. Hart, 43 Conn. 480, 485 (Conn. 1876).
29. NBC4.TV, Torrance Man Vows To Change Child Support Laws: Man Ordered To Support Child He Says Isn't His,
(Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.nbc4.tv/news/2891653/detail.html
(last visited Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Torrance Man].
30. Id.; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 473(b) (2006).
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had expired leaving him unable to contest the
decision.3 1 James expended $50,000 in legal
fees and child support payments as he unsuccessfully sought relief from the judgment. 32 Despite DNA tests that conclusively disprove his
paternity, and the mother's recantation of her
prior false identification, James continues to be
bound by the default judgment.3 3 In a recent
court ruling that denied one of James' numerous requests for relief from the judgment, the
judge wrote that while "the evidence is overwhelming that [James] is a victim of fraud instigated by the woman . . . [t]his is one of the
most unjust results a judge could render, but
based on the laws on the books in California,
34
there is no discretion to hold otherwise.,
In the James case, the court chose to uphold the finality of the default judgment despite
DNA evidence of its falsity.3 5 Finality doctrines
serve many valid purposes in the law: they provide conclusive resolution of disputes so that
parties can proceed with their affairs; they prevent litigious losers from monopolizing scarce
judicial resources; and they protect courts from
rendering inconsistent judgments in the same
case.36 In this case, however, none of the parties will benefit from the finality of this judgment because they all believe it to be wrong.3 7
Protecting the finality of this judgment, however, does yield some stealth beneficiaries: the
California Department of Child Welfare, which
is spared the effort of searching for the true biological father; the biological father, who is

31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473(b); see also Email from
Marc Angelucci to Anne Abramson (Feb. 25, 2006, 12:33
AM) (on file with author).
32. Torrance Man, supra note 29; CaliforniaMen Fight Paternity Claims, UPI News, Jan. 16, 2005 (reporting James paid
$12,000 in child support and $38,000 in legal fees). In September, 2005, James won a $44,868.65 default judgment
against the woman who had falsely identified him as the
child's father. Press Release, National Coalition of Free
Men, NCFM Los Angeles Chapter Wins Victory in Paternity
Fraud Case, http://ncfm.org/activities.php (last visited Apr.
13, 2006).
33. Torrance Man, supra note 29.
34. Id. In this proceeding, James tried to stop the garnishment of his unemployment compensation in a hearing before
the California Appeals Board. Id. When asked why he was
vulnerable to misidentification, James offered the following
explanation: "Her father was in the Navy years ago, and she
knew about the benefits... Here I am in the Gulf War, and if
I was killed, she could make a claim on a $200,000 life insurance policy on the child's behalf." Id.

[Vol. 27:139 2006]

spared the responsibility for his biological and
parental obligations; and the judicial system,
which is spared the indignity of contradicting itself.
C. The Volunteer
Patrick McCarthy never suspected that his
marital daughter was not his biological daughter until his former wife suggested it after their
divorce.38 Goaded by her suggestion, McCarthy
performed an at-home DNA test.3 9 When the
results established that he was not the girl's biological father, McCarthy said, "[i]t's an indescribable feeling: like death, like a horrible
grief, like I had been the father to a stranger.
Everything I thought
was true suddenly wasn't
4
true anymore.

0

McCarthy ostensibly had two choices: he
could disclose the DNA results and live with the
consequences or he could disregard the test results and continue to parent the child. 41 He
chose the latter. 42 Eventually his daughter

learned about the DNA test from her mother.43
When she asked McCarthy who her father was,
he said he did not know, but that she would always be his daughter. 44 McCarthy's choice ap-

pears valiant, but its valor is somewhat mitigated by the advice he received from a lawyer
informing him that he had no true choice at all:
no court would permit him to renounce his paternity.45

35. Id.
36. 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4403 at 26 (2d ed. 2002). "The deepest interests underlying
the conclusive effect of prior adjudication draw from the purpose to provide a means of finally ending private disputes.
The central role of adversary litigation in our society is to
provide binding answers. We want to free people from the
uncertain prospect of litigation, with all its costs to emotional
peace and the ordering of future affairs. Repose is the most
important product of [the finality doctrine]." Id. at 26-27.
37. Torrance Man, supra note 29.
38. Padawer, supra note 15.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Padawer, supra note 15.
45. Id.
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From a constitutional point of view, the
man has protectable property and liberty interThe Fourteenth Amendment of the
ests."
United States Constitution states, "[n]o state
shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.",5 3 This language has been construed to mean that the state

must provide a person with appropriate procedural opportunities to defend his property or
liberty interest before the state can deprive him
of either.54
When paternal obligations are disputed,
the man's property interest is substantial. The
legal and financial consequences of being adjudicated "the father" - whether by presumption,
55
estoppel, consent, or decree - are onerous.
Until the child reaches the age of majority, "the
father" is financially responsible for the child's
health, welfare, and education. 6 The child is
his legal heir and through him may be entitled
to receive Social Security, Workers Compensation, and other social service benefits.57 If "the
father" fails to meet his financial obligations to
the child, the state can seize and confiscate his
property.5 8 In some jurisdictions, the man can
be imprisoned for failure to meet his support
obligations. 59 Although society condones the
imposition of such burdens when a man is the
child's biological father, it is not as righteous
when an innocent man is so treated.
The man's liberty interest is also substantial. A man who has been wrongfully adjudicated a "legal father" has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in freedom from
government intrusion in his privacy and personhood without due process of law.6' When a
husband discovers that his marital child is not

46. Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 732 (citing Goldman, 184 A.2d
at 355. "[T]here is something disgusting about a husband
who, moved by bitterness toward his wife, suddenly questions the legitimacy of her child whom he has been accepting
and recognizing as his own." Id.).
47. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating
the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W.
VA. L. REV. 547, 600 (2000); State ex rel. G.M.F. v W.F.F.,
728 S.2d 144, 146 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (setting aside prior
judgment of paternity after man's ex-wife admitted that the
child was not his. The court noted, "to require [the father] to
continue to pay child support for a child who is not his... is
morally reprehensible").
48. See, e.g., Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 733; Hammack v.
Hammack, 737 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
49. K.B., 639 N.E.2d at 731 (presumptive father not estopped from raising nonpaternity defense based on blood
tests).
50. Misovich, 688 A.2d at 733.
51. See, e.g., K.B., 639 N.E.2d at 730; Symonds v. Symonds,
432 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Mass. 1982); Sandy M. v. Timothy J.,
524 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998); Bergan v. Bergan, 572 N.W.2d 272,275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Berrisford v.
Berrisford, 322 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Minn. 1982).
52. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 586 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.

54. See Rivera, 483 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 583-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 576-77 n.2.
57. See id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1998) (stating that the federal government may seize the federal tax refunds of a man who owes
past due child support payments in order to make such payments).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2001).
60. Colegio Puertorriqueno De Ninas, Liceo Ponceno, Inc.
v. Pesquera De Busquets, 464 F. Supp. 761,765 (D.P.R. 1979)
(noting that privacy rights are found "in the First Amendment, in the 'liberty' protected by the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as in the strictures of the Fourth Amendment's guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. More characteristically, privacy rights have been described as arising from the
'penumbras' or 'shadows' of the Bill of Rights." (internal citations omitted)). Unlike the right to privacy, the concept of
"personhood" does not lend itself to a precise definition.
Judge Craven states that personhood "includes elements of
the concepts of individuality, autonomy, and privacy."
Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone,
1976 DUKE L. J. 699, 702 (1976). Similarly, Professor Freund
believes that personhood includes "those attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood." Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 356 n.2 (4th Cir. 1976).

III. CONFLICTING INTERESTS
A. The Wrongfully Adjudicated Father: Why
Me?
A man who seeks to renounce paternity
based on DNA evidence of non-paternity wants
financial, emotional, and legal freedom from
the child. Such a man faces a morass of conflicting legal and social norms. Some courts
find the man's attempted renunciation to be
reprehensible,46 while other courts find the perpetration of a fraud on an innocent man to be
reprehensible.4" Some courts uphold the man's
financial obligations despite DNA evidence of
non-paternity," while other courts hold that
DNA evidence of non-paternity is dispositive of
the man's legal obligations. 9 Some courts enforce their power to impose financial obligations on the man despite their powerlessness to
enforce father-child relationships.5 ° Other
courts hold that the judiciary should not create
financial or familial relationships by law that do
not exist in fact. 5 '
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his biological child but that he cannot legally escape his paternal obligations, his liberty interests in personhood and privacy suffer more than
humiliation. He is caught in a prisoner's dilemma: if he disputes his parental obligations,
he is stigmatized as a cad, craven and selfish,
placing his own well being before that of the
child. If he acquiesces to his parental obligations, he is stigmatized as a cuckold, duped into
carrying another man's emotional and financial
burden.
The non-marital father who tries to renounce his paternal obligations may be similarly stigmatized as irresponsible, immature, or
devious. 61 This stigma may be especially harmful to his other relationships - especially those
with his employer, who may be required to garnish his wages, or his spouse, or partner, or
other children.62
In either situation, the man's liberty interest suffers punishment borne in great disproportion to fault. This punishment is greatly exacerbated when finality doctrines prevent the
man from disproving his paternity with DNA
evidence of non-paternity that was unavailable
at the time of the original paternity adjudication. Under these circumstances, the man has
been denied a constitutionally meaningful opportunity to defend his liberty and property interests.6 3

61. See Rivera, 483 U.S. at 585 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Robert L.A. v. Sharon A.R., 185 A.D.2d 977,
979 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that blood tests are admissible to rebut the presumption of legitimacy only if in the
best interest of the child); Vito L. v. Filomena L., 172 A.D.2d
648, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("[S]ince the effect of the [paternity] tests would only confirm the presumption of legitimacy ... without establishing the identity of the natural father. No purpose would be served in branding the child
'illegitimate' and depriving her of the only father she has
known."); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 418 (McKinney 1999) (stating that blood tests may be excluded if such would not be in
the best interests of the child.); DEL. CODE ANN. 13, § 8-608
(2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.608 (2003); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.26.535 (2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-808
(2003) (permitting courts to use the best interest of the child
as a factor in determining whether to order DNA testing).
64. See Monroe v. Monroe, 621 A.2d 898, 905 (Md. 1993).
65. Little, 452 U.S. at 13.
66. See Gerry B. Melton, Toward "Personhood"for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values in Public Policy, 38
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 100 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 634 (1979) (noting that children's constitutional rights

[Vol. 27:139 2006]

B. The Child: Is Truth in the Child's Best
Interest?
By allowing a paternity determination to
be challenged, paternal renunciation both protects and harms children. A child can be profoundly harmed by the abandonment of the
only "father" he or she has ever known.'
Without countervailing knowledge of the true
biological father's identity, a child's own identity may become suffused with questions of
fault, deception, and abandonment. On the
other hand, the accurate determination of nonpaternity gives the child the truth - or some
truth. As a moral proposition, truth probably is
more beneficial to children than deceit. However, even if paternal renunciation inures to the
child's moral benefit, it may be hard to justify to
a seven year old why she is better off with the
truth than with a father.
From a constitutional point of view, the
United States Supreme Court has held that children have a compelling interest in the accurate
determination of their paternity.6 5 Although
children have some protected liberty interests,
those interests are defined very differently from
those of adults.6 6 The "adult" liberty interest

recognizes adults as autonomous, self-sufficient
persons who are free to conduct their lives
within the confines of the law. 67 Accordingly,
parents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the care, custody, and control of their
children.68 The Constitution, however, views
are not co-extensive with those of adults because of "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decision in an informal, mature manner; and the importance
of the parental role in child rearing."); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE, 10304 (1982) (stating that the law does not ascribe the full attributes of "adulthood" - such as liberty, entitlement and responsibility - to children).
67. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (1979); ZIMRING, supra note
66, at 103-04.
68. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (parents have the right to control the education of their children
and the Fourteenth Amendment protects parental right to
bring up children); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 532
(1953) (reasoning parents have a fundamental "right to the
care, custody, management and companionship of ...minor
children); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("The
liberty interest at issue in this case - the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children - is perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
this court"(citations omitted)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child resides first with the parents.").
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children as persons in need of protection and
support.69 Rather than liberty, children have a
right to "custody" - to be kept within the protective custody of a responsible adult, or the
state.7" In recognition of the distinction between liberty and custody, Chief Justice Rehnquist once said that children, unlike adults, "are
always in some form of custody."'"
Traditionally, the child's liberty interest in
custody has been evaluated under the "best interest of the child" standard.72 In a perfect
world, the best interest of the child is achieved
when devoted, responsible adults unite for the
common good of raising, loving, protecting, and
providing for the well being of their child. Absent perfection, the best interest of the child
standard must measure benefits against harms
to determine either the best available or least
detrimental alternative for the child.73
Paternal renunciation greatly challenges
the best interest of the child standard. The best
interest standard plays a primary role in judicial
determinations of the proper placement for a
child whose custody is in dispute. 74 Paternal renunciation turns the custody issue on its head.
It shifts the issue from which of two parents is
the best custodial placement for a child to
whether the child can assert custody over the
father - or at least his bank account.

Because of this twist in the custody issue,
courts are seriously divided over whether the
best interest standard is relevant to determine if
DNA evidence should be admitted to disprove
paternity. Some courts hold that biology is dispositive of legal paternity and, therefore, the
best interest standard is irrelevant to that determination.75 Other courts hold that the best interest standard becomes relevant only after biological parentage has been determined and
69. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; see also Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 265 (1984) (stating that "[c]hildren, by definition, are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves").
70. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 169 (noting that "[w]hat may be
wholly permissible for adults . . . may not be so for children."); Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (stating
that "[t]raditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of
self-determination - including even the right of liberty in its
narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will. They are
subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the control of
their parents or guardians").
71. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 (citing Lehman v. Lycoming
City Children's Serv., 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982)).

custody is in dispute.76 Still other courts hold
that the best interest standard is wholly dispositive of the paternal renunciation issue, and adwhichmit or exclude DNA evidence based on 77
interest.
best
child's
the
in
is
ruling
ever
From the child's perspective, the dispute
over whether the admission or exclusion of
DNA evidence satisfies the best interest standard begs a more important question: what is
the best interest of a child in a paternal renunciation case? Are children better served by the
biological truth, even when it hurts, or by legal
constructs that substitute fiction for fact even
when the truth is knowable but disruptive of the
status quo?
The answer to this question is neither clear
nor clearly legal. While the harmful consequences of paternal renunciation must be recognized, they must also be evaluated in relation
to the benefits to the child and the countervailing harms to the man. Interestingly, the
weighing of harms and benefits may not make
adversaries of the man and the child. Legal
constructs such as the marital presumption, the
estoppel and finality doctrines, and the best interest of the child standard uphold the status
quo while denying both the man and the child
legal recognition of the biological truth of their
relationship. Before DNA paternity tests were
available, these legal constructs were justified
because biological paternity was unknowable.
Now, however, their continued use is less justifiable since the biological truth of paternity is
knowable, and frequently is known by the child,
the legal father, and the court.
DNA has brought into sharp relief the conflict between legal truths and biological truths.
Legal constructs that historically substituted for
unknowable facts now bar recognition of facts
72.

ROBERT

H.

MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD,

FAMILY AND STATE 913 (4th ed. 2000).
73. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 53-55 (1973).
74. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 72, at 913; Jes-

sica Pearson & Marta A. Ring, Judicial Decision-making in
Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 704 (1982-83).
75. See, e.g., K.B., 639 N.E.2d at 730; Spaeth v. Warren,
478 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
76. See, e.g., Langston, 754 A.2d at 409-10 (holding that
the best interest standard can be considered only in custody
disputes or "otherrelated issues but not in paternity determinations).
77. See supra note 63.
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that are knowable. For children, state sanctioned obfuscation of the truth of their biological paternity may be too great a deprivation of
liberty to survive constitutional challenge. In
light of DNA proof of paternity to the contrary,
the child may have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in not being deceived by the
government about who is or is not his father.
C. The Mother: A Hobson's Choice
Mothers do not fare well in paternal renunciation cases. More accurately, mothers are
treated like the villainous Livia Drusilla who
ensures her child's legitimacy through cunning
and deceit.78 The mother is vilified because, despite knowledge that she had multiple sexual
partners during the period of conception, she
has wrongfully identified one man as the biological father of her child, accepted his money, encouraged him to parent her child, and upon revelation of the DNA test results, tries to prevent
him from disproving his paternity in court.7 9
More to the point, women are vilified in
paternal renunciation cases because they are
presumed to have lied to the legal father (who
may or may not be their spouse), the child, the
welfare department in some cases, and the biological father in others. Assuming the truth of
this assumption, why do mothers lie about the
biological paternity of their children? Some
mothers lie because they are selfish, rotten people. Sometimes, however, the lie is compelled
by circumstances. A mother may lie to protect
her family, husband, and child from herself. The
price of unity may be deceit. A mother may lie
because she is herself a child who is afraid to
identify the biological father. A mother may lie
because she does not know the identity of the
father.
Some lies are compelled by law. The marital presumption of paternity consigns women to
78. See generally ROBERT GRAVES, I, CLAUDIUS: FROM
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF TIBERIUS CLAUDIUS 14-52 (Vintage International 1989) (1934).
79. See, e.g., Rivera, 483 U.S. at 576-77 n.2 (citing Minnich
v. Rivera, 506 A.2d 879, 882 (Pa. 1986)).
80. Brief of Petitioner at *7, Wise v. Fryar, 534 U.S. 1079
(2002) (No. 01-562).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(6)

(2000).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) provides that if an individual
does not comply with a state to establish paternity for support purposes, it "(A) shall deduct from the assistance that
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perjury by preventing them from denying in
court that their husband is their child's father.8 °
Welfare law encourages fraud by giving
mothers the Hobson's choice of naming the
right man, the wrong man, or no man.81 If she
names the right man, she will be eligible to receive child support from him and welfare assistance for herself and her child. If she names the
wrong man, she will still be eligible to receive
child support from him and welfare assistance
for herself and her child. However, if she
names no man, she will not be eligible to receive financial or welfare support for either herself or the child. If the aid is insufficient, she
and her child will have to fend for themselves frequently in the streets.
Whether the mother's conduct is the result
of mistake or deceit, circumstances or compulsion, in a courtroom she is foreclosed from arguing that the father's renunciation is harmful
to her child's best interests. In fact, the mother
cannot make any arguments in court on behalf
of her child. The paternal renunciation proceeding is a consequence of her conduct: both
past, by falsely identifying the wrong father, and
present, by trying to maintain financial support
for her child while protecting herself from
claims of perjury. The last thing the mother
wants is a legal determination of non-paternity.83 The mother's need to exclude DNA test
results places her legal interests in conflict with
her child's legal entitlement to an accurate determination of paternity.
D. The Biological Father: Who, Me?
Biological fathers do not typically bring paternal renunciation cases. Occasionally, a biological father learns that he has a child and attempts to establish his paternal rights to the
child by challenging the paternity of another
man, usually the mother's spouse.8 4 These cases
would otherwise be provided to the family of the individual
under the State program ... [by] an amount equal to not less
than 25 percent of the amount of such assistance; and (B)
may deny the family any assistance under the State program.
Id.; see also French v. Mansour, 834 F.2d 115, 116 (6th Cir.
1987); SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 143 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the problem of maternal non-cooperation with the requirement to
identify the father.).
83. See Brief of Petitioner at *7, supra note 80.
84. E.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114. Michael H. fathered
a child with a married woman. He maintained an active role
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seldom succeed. More typically, the legal father
will name the biological father as a defense to a
suit for child support arrearages in the hope of
shifting liability onto him. 85 Frequently, the biological father had no prior knowledge of his
child; or, if he had prior knowledge of the child
he soon learned how to evade his parental responsibilities. Such men have no protectable
liberty interest in avoiding their financial and
legal obligations to their children.86 Most typically, however, the sole function of the biological father in paternal renunciation cases is to be
the male available for the occasion of conception.87
E. The State's Interest: Ignoring the Elephant
in the Room
Interestingly, state welfare departments,
not adjudicated fathers, instigate most paternal
renunciation actions.88 In the typical case, a
welfare department sues a legal father for child
support arrearages and he defends by introducing DNA evidence, which was not available at
the time of the original paternity determination,
to prove that he is not genetically related to the
child he has been ordered to support. Frequently, the man not only has defaulted on his
support obligations but has renounced his familial relationship to the child as well. Less typically, a man will initiate a paternal renunciation action in the hope of obtaining relief from
a final, non-appealable judgment that was enin the child's life and eventually sued to be declared the
child's father and receive visitation rights. The Court held
that although Michael was the biological father he did not
have a liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with the
child because the mother's husband was presumed to be the
child's father and both spouses opposed Michael's lawsuit.
Id. at 113-14, 127.
85. E.g., Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I. 1994)
86. See Rivera, 483 U.S. at 580.
87. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 79.
88. Langston, 754 A.2d at 409 ("In the great majority of
these cases, it is the State, on behalf of the mother, who initiates the proceeding against the putative father.").
89. See, e.g., Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475 (Neb. 2002);
Libro v. Walls, 746 P.2d 632, 633 (Nev. 1987) (presumed father was permitted to raise non-paternity as a defense to support arrearages); M.A.F. v. G.L.K., 573 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (in a divorce proceeding, the court held
that the wife's intentional concealment that her husband was
not the biological father of the marital child was extrinsic
fraud that vitiated his paternal obligation).
90. See Little, 452 U.S. at 14.

tered before DNA evidence of non-paternity
was available.89
The state clearly has a legitimate interest in
enforcing the right man's support obligation.9 °
Conversely, the state has no legitimate interest
in enforcing the wrong man's support obligation, especially since the United States Supreme
Court repeatedly has said that the state has an
interest in providing a "fair and impartial adjudication" of paternity.91 Consequently, the
state's interests are aligned with those of the
child and the legal father in obtaining an accurate determination of paternity.92
The state's authority to enforce its interest
in child welfare, parental financial support, and
fair and accurate paternity determinations is
based on two common law doctrines: the
"parens patriae" doctrine 93 and the "police
power."94 The parens patriaedoctrine permits a
state to promote the welfare of any one child in
particular, whereas the police power permits
the state to promote the welfare of children in
general. 95 Through these powers, the state can
protect children by invoking a broad arsenal of
enforcement mechanisms against "deadbeat
dads." For example, a man who willfully fails to
obey a child support order can be held in civil
contempt. The usual penalty for civil contempt
is to pay the financial arrearages or go to jail
and then pay the arrearages in order to be released. 96 The state also can attach a man's

property and sell it, or garnish his salary, to sat-

91. Rivera, 483 U.S. at 581 n.8; see also Little, 452 U.S. at
14.
92. Little, 452 U.S. at 14.
93. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 82, at 8-11. The
"parens patriae" doctrine is based on English common law
that requires the government to assume responsibility for
persons incapable of caring for themselves - most frequently
the elderly, disabled and children. In contemporary usage the
parens patriae doctrine is the legal basis for state regulation
of abuse and neglect, foster care, adoption, child support, status offense restrictions, and delinquency jurisdiction.
94. Id. at 10-11 (citing Developments in the Law - The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1198-99
(1980)). The "police power" is an attribute of sovereignty
that gives a state plenary power both to prevent its citizens
from harming one another and to promote all aspects of public welfare.
95. Id. at 10.
96. Id. at 372 (citing Pettit v. Pettit, 626 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.
1993)); see also MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 72, at
334.
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isfy child support arrearages.97 A more severe
sanction for failure to pay child support is available under the Deadbeat Parents Punishment
Act of 1998, which authorizes criminal arrest
and punishment for parents who evade child
support obligations.98 The state also has the
power to subject deadbeat dads to motor vehicle, professional, occupational, and recreational
delicensing. 99
When the state uses its substantial powers
to enforce its interest in child welfare through
judicial determinations of paternity, orders of
support, civil, criminal, and quasi-criminal enforcement mechanisms, it is engaging in "state
action." 100 All state action must be constitutional to be lawful. The Constitution requires
that any action a state takes against a person's
life, liberty or property satisfy due process.10 '
The sine qua non of due process is fundamental
fairness: 0 2 to satisfy due process, the state must
provide a person with a "'meaningful opportunity to be heard"' 10' 3 before it can infringe on
that person's "life, liberty, or property." 104 Although the requirements of due process vary
with the context, 0 5 due process always asks the
same question: how much process is due this
person in this situation to protect his or her
rights to life, liberty, and property as against action by the state? Due process does not require
that the state provide the person with the most
definitive procedures.1 0 6 It does require, however, that the person be given a fair and impartial opportunity to appear and defend his life,
liberty, or property before such interests can be
infringed by coercive state action.

The constitutional test for determining how
much process is due was articulated in Matthews
v. Eldridge, which set forth a three point analysis a court must consider when deciding if a person has been deprived of life, liberty or property without due process. 10 7 The analysis
requires a court to determine (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest under current law; and
(3) the government's interest and the burden it
will sustain if the current law is altered. °8 In
the paternal renunciation context, the child and
the wrongfully named man have an interest in
the accurate determination of the child's paternity. The risk of an erroneous paternity determination is virtually assured if DNA evidence
of non-paternity is excluded from the record.
Finally, the government has no legitimate interest in an inaccurate determination of paternity
despite the financial burden it will incur if it
fails to find the true biological father.
Before DNA paternity testing was available, paternity disputes were resolved by legal
presumptions, estoppel, and finality doctrines
that foreclosed the relitigation of paternity issues. 10 9 These constructs were legally justified
because there was no better way to resolve the
matter. Consequently, when paternity determinations were informed by the best available information, the legal father received as much
process as was possible. The adyent of DNA
testing has changed the meaning of due process
in the paternity context. The state's interest in
adjudicating paternity and enforcing support
obligations now must be redefined to recognize
that advances in DNA technology have the ca-

97. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 82, at 367-73; see also
MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 72, at 333 (noting that "if
a wife can get personal jurisdiction over the husband, then
the decree may be enforced like any other money judgment").
98. 18 U.S.C. § 228. The constitutionality of this Act was
upheld in United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397 (8th Cir.
1997); but see United States v. Pillor, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1057 (N.D. Cal. 2005); United States v. Morrow, 368 F. Supp.
2d 863, 866 (C.D. Ill. 2005) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 228(b),
which provides that "the existence of a child support obligation that was in effect for the time period charged in the indictment or information creates a rebuttable presumption
that the obligor has the ability to pay the support obligation
for that time period" was unconstitutional).
99. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 82, at 372 (citing In re
Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Giberson, 581
N.W.2d 351, 355 (Minn. 1998) (attorney's failure to pay child
support resulted in suspension of law license)).

100. See Little, 452 U.S. at 9 (noting that state action undeniably pervaded the paternity determination case).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides, in part, "no state shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... "
102. See Little, 452 U.S. at 16.
103. Id. (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377
(1971)).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
105. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (noting
that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands").
106. See id.
107. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 451 (1997).
108. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
109. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 70-72.
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pacity to contradict historically entrenched legal
constructs about the truth of paternity. State
action that bases paternity adjudications on outmoded legal constructs despite scientific proof
to the contrary is like ignoring the elephant in
the room. Such willful blindness to the evolving
nature of truth denies both the child and the
wrongfully adjudicated father a "meaningful
opportunity" to defend their rights to an accurate determination of paternity.
IV. SOLUTIONS
A. Tragic Choices
Sometimes the business of law is line drawing - and sometimes line drawing yields tragic
choices. The evolving right of paternal renunciation raises the inscrutable question of whether
paternity is a socio-legal construct or is strictly a
matter of biology. Inevitably, the law must
choose what it values most - scientific facts or
legal constructs. Legal constructs, such as the
presumption of legitimacy, finality doctrines,
and the best interest of the child standard, protect children from illegitimacy, financial hardship, and emotional abandonment. They maintain social stability and the consistent rule of
law when the truth is unknowable or better alternatives are unavailable. However, when legal constructs foreclose recognition of scientific
facts, the law is not trying to ascertain the truth.
Rather, the law is acting as a conservator of social values in general, even when they no longer
exist in fact.'1
110. Id. at 75-76.
111. Id. at 79.
112. The states that permit paternal renunciation are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming. See infra notes 121-29.
113. LA. Civ. CODE. ANN. arts. 187-89 (Supp. 2006).
114. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-607 (Supp. 2004); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(3) (2002) (provides putative father
two years to challenge paternity after father has knowledge
of "relevant facts" and does not permit two year window after child has reached age eighteen); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.26.530 (West 2005).
115. ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166(b)(2) (2004) (provides for
three years after birth or three years after father "knew or
should have known" of birth, whichever is later.) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.57(1)(b) (West 2003) (provides for two
years after man has "reason to believe" and no later than
three years after birth.).
116. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.607 (Vernon Supp.
2005) (provides for renunciation no later than child's fourth

When the prevailing value is science, the
role of the law is to accept factual accuracy,
even when the facts are inconvenient or disruptive of the status quo."1 Valuing scientific facts
over legal constructs bars courts from substituting medieval legal fictions about families for the
realities of twenty-first century familial relationships. The biological choice vindicates the
wrongfully adjudicated father; it encourages the
mother and welfare department to more accurately attempt to identify the true biological father; and it informs rather than misinforms the
child about the truth of his or her biological
heritage.
B. New Laws
Since 1997, nineteen states have enacted an
assortment of statutes that attempt to provide
legal solutions to the paternal renunciation dilemma." 2 Like the case law that preceded the
statutes, these legislative models are inconsistent. For example, Louisiana permits paternity
to be challenged within one year from when the
father learns or should have learned of the
child's birth;" 3 Delaware, Illinois, and Washington permit two years;" 4 Alaska and Minnesota
permit three years;'15 Texas permits four
years; 16 Colorado, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wyoming permit up to five years;' 1 7 and Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, and Virginia do not place any time
limits on paternity challenges.1 8 Alaska and
Virginia do not specify who can or cannot chalbirthday, except: 1) when presumed father/mother did not
live together nor did not have sex during the probable time
of conception or 2) presumed father never held child out as
his own. If either condition is met, renunciation is permitted
at anytime.).
117. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(1)(b) (West
2005); N.J. STAT. ANN, § 9:17-45(b) (1998) (provides for renunciation five years after child reached majority.); OH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 3111.05 (LexisNexis 2003); (provides for renunciation five years after child reached majority.); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-807 (2005) (provides for renunciation no
later than child's fifth birthday, except: 1) when presumed father/mother did not live together nor did not have sex during
the probable time of conception or 2) presumed father never
held child out as his own. If either condition is met, renunciation is permitted at anytime.).
118. ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2005) (providing that a man who is adjudicated or deemed the father of a
child without scientific testing, he is entitled to one scientific
test to establish or refute paternity at any time during which
he is required to pay child support); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-
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lenge paternity;"' Arkansas permits only adjudicated fathers to challenge paternity;2 ° Maryland permits only fathers of non-marital
children to challenge paternity;121 Illinois, Iowa,
and Minnesota permit the child, mother, and
adjudicated father to challenge paternity;122
Colorado, Delaware, and Wyoming permit the
child, mother, adjudicated father, and welfare
department to challenge paternity;123 Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas permit the child,
mother, adjudicated father, welfare department,
and the alleged biological father to challenge
paternity;124 Alabama, Montana and Washington permit any "interested party" to challenge
paternity. 25 Georgia and Illinois require the
adjudicated father to produce DNA proof of
non-paternity as a prerequisite to filing the action."' Most other states, however, permit the
court to order DNA testing after the paternal
renunciation action has been filed. 27 Delaware, Iowa, Texas, and Wyoming rely primarily
on the best interest of the child standard to determine whether to admit DNA evidence of
non-paternity. 12 Conversely, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, and Washington permit DNA to
be admitted to prove non-paternity but also require courts to determine whether renunciation
is in the child's best interests. 129 Most states,
however, do not take into account the best interest standard when determining renunciation."'

CODE ANN § 600B.41A(3)(a) (West 2001);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM § 5-1038 (LexisNexis 2004); Mo.
STAT. § 210.826 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6108(1) (2005); and VA. CODE ANN. §20-49.10 (West 2006).
119. ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (2004); VA. CODE ANN.

54 (2004); IowA

§20-49.10 (West 2006).
120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (Supp. 2005).
121. Stubbs v. Colandrea, 841 A.2d 361, 369 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004).
122. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b) (West 1999); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600B.41A(3)(a)(1) (West 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.57(1) (West 2003).
123. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(1) (2003); 13
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-602 (Supp. 2004); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-802 (2005).
124. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.826 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-45(a) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.04(A) (LexisNexis 2003); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.602 (2002).
125. ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(b) (1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-6-107(1) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.530
(West 2005).
126. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2004); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/(5-b) (2005).
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C. Pandora's Box or Safety-Valve?
The overriding goal of paternal renunciation laws must be to minimize the risk of erroneous determinations"' - if not of the past then
in the future. That goal entails two tasks: making future paternity adjudications more accurate and providing safety-valve exceptions for
relief from erroneous judgments.132 While
neither goal forecloses courts from using legal
constructs to equitably distribute the burdens
and benefits of paternity determinations, both
goals require courts to recognize that DNA is
relevant to that determination.
The law, however, is a blunt instrument
that has the power to do harm even when it intends to do good. For example, to minimize the
risk of erroneous paternity adjudications, the
law could require DNA testing at all births, all
divorces, all actions for child support, and all
other adjudications of paternity. The law could
criminalize paternity fraud and make perjurious
misidentifications by women a criminal offense. 133 Although these remedies may encourage more accurate paternity determinations, they also invite excessive government
intrusion into privacy and consensual relationships. Such draconian measures may be too
high a price to pay for truth.
Another alternative may be private civil
actions. For example, a wrongfully adjudicated
father could file a paternity fraud or defamation
action against the woman who misidentified
127. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115(e)(1)(A)
(2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-112 (2005).
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-608 (Supp. 2004); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600B.41A(6)(a)(2) (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 106.608 (Vernon 2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-808
(2005).
129. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(2)(a) (2005); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-1038 (LexisNexis 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.26.535 (2005).
130. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166(c) (2004); ARK.
CODE ANN.§ 9-10-115(f)(1)
(2002); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§210.834(4) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.09(D)
(LexisNexis 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §20-49.10 (2001).
131. See Langston, 754 A.2d at 405-06 n.15 (citing Jane
Bowling, ForcingPaternity in the Name of Finality and Expediency, DAILY RECORD, Nov. 12, 1994)
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-37-21 (2002); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:125.2 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-37
(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-22 (2003).
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him.' 3 4 Such relief, however, would be limited
to monetary damages - payable only if the woman has money. The suit could not disestablish
the man's paternity because only the state, not
private parties, can provide that relief. Or, the
child whose paternity has been disestablished
could bring a private tort action for paternity
fraud - but against whom? The state for wrongful adjudication? The mother for misidentification? The adjudicated father for breach of
promise? The biological father for abandonment? A right without a meaningful remedy is
not a viable solution.
Another solution is the one with which
nineteen states are currently experimenting safety-valve legislation that permits wrongfully
adjudicated men to obtain relief from erroneous adjudications.135 Many states are reluctant
to enact these statutes for fear that they will
open a Pandora's Box of renunciation cases and
consequences. However, safety-valve legislation permits but does not require aggrieved
men to challenge prior paternity determinations.136 Without safety-valve legislation, men
may be compelled to seek DNA tests upon the
births of their children or the dissolution of
their marriages lest they be foreclosed forever

from making such challenges. Those consequences may cause more harm to more children
then the purported harms of safety-valve legislation.

134. See, e.g., Day, 653 N.W.2d at 479 (declining to recognize a cause of action for fraud or assumpsit against a women
for misrepresenting who is biological father of her child); but
see Kohl v. Amundson, 620 N.W.2d 606, 607 (S.D. 2001)
(holding mother must repay child support paid to her by misidentified father); NCFM Press Release, supra note 32.

135. See statutes, supra notes 113-20, 122-30, 133.
136. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2004); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.535 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-1038 (LexisNexis 2004).

V. CONCLUSION
The application of DNA to paternity determinations has had a profoundly disruptive effect on historically entrenched legal constructs
of "fatherhood." Many men who believed they
had fathered children now know that they did
not. When some of these men try to renounce
their paternal obligations for these children
they find, despite DNA proof of non-paternity,
that the legal designation of "father" is immutable. The resulting conflict between legally binding adjudications of paternity and subsequent
DNA revelations of non-paternity pit man
against child, man against woman, and man
against state. The role of the law is to choose
which set of truths - legal or scientific - to ac-

cept as final and conclusive proof of paternity.
Although the values and methodologies for
making this choice are currently in dispute, it is
indisputable that there will be no painless resolution of the conflict.
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